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Campbell: Nuclear War and Computer-Generated Nuclear Alerts

nuclear war and computer generated
nuclear alerts
douglas campbell
both the US and USSR military systems are based on two assumptions
about computers and nuclear alerts everything will work the way it is
supposed to work nothing will happen until it is supposed to happen

in the recent movie war games an ingenious teenager penetrates the
pentagons computer codes and touches off a nuclear alert at the
headquarters of the US missile detection and launch facilities the
computer generated screens indicate that soviet missiles launched from
offshore submarines will arrive in five minutes the teenager tells the
military officer in charge that the alert is an accident that the attack
is not real but is computer generated and that he should ignore all
the computer data thus the officer must decide within five minutes
whether to believe the computer data so graphically displayed before his
million dollar defense system upon which
multimillion
eyes or to believe that this multi
our security depends could accidentally trigger a nuclear alert if the
alert is real and the officer ignores it the US military offensive capacity
could be destroyed along with millions of citizens if the alert is only a
computer glitch and the officer acts as if it were real he could accidentally
III
launch world war 111
lii at the last second he rejects the computer
ili
system trusts his own human judgment and does not launch
this sequence may seem implausible but at the end of this
article 1I will narrate a documented historical event that approximates
the movie although the movie is farfetched in some respects it is
true that our entire nuclear arsenal is intimately and absolutely linked
to decisions made by computer systems how did this dependence arise
do the inherent dangers point to a need for a change in national policy
THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

our military dependence on computers goes back to world war 11
II
to a time when congress still declared war and the president was
commander in chief to a time when the allies invented the computer
for code breaking and nuclear weapons for mass destruction at the
II two huge oceans protected us from a surprise
end of world war 11

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1985

1

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 6

78

BYU studies

soviet attack to launch fleets of airplanes loaded with conventional
bombs would involve tens of thousands of men massive amounts of
materiel and numerous telltale signs available to ordinary intelligence
gathering conventional bombers required twelve hours from takeoff
to attack twelve hours in which there would be time for diplomatic
consultation exchange of cables rational thought twelve hours in
which the planes could be ordered to turn back or could be granted
an emergency landing at worst if emergency negotiations failed
conventional bombs would cause modest damage but not annihilation
in the sixties and seventies however the development and perfection
of intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs capable of carrying nuclear
warheads gready
greatly increased the possibility of massive destruction by surprise
attack ICBMs can be launched without tipping off the other country
by mobilizing tens of thousands of navigators pilots bombardiers
bombardiere
bombar diers
and supply officers the time from launch to destruction could be as
short as two hours two hours to use the hot line to make sure that
an attack is not a flock of canada geese or the rising moon
two hours to make sure the attack is a government decision and not
Strang elove in charge of an isolated squadron two hours to
dr strangelove
moderate the response and have only a limited nuclear war two hours
to warn the civilian population to evacuate their cities but even if
hot line negotiations succeed there is no way to call back the missiles
no way to provide them with an emergency landing field
in the seventies and eighties the perfection of submarine launched
ballistic missiles SLBMs on submarines cruising a few miles off the
enemy s shoreline reduced the time from launch to destruction to
fifteen minutes no time for hot line negotiation no time for recall
of missiles barely enough time for detection from the moment the
duty officer determines that an attack is under way there are only two
minutes to decide on the level of response and to issue the order to
launch on warning to computer controlled missiles aimed at
computer selected targets kept in computer databanks
but in the eighties and nineties new star wars technology will
allow multiple nuclear warheads to be delivered by stationary
geostationary
geo
satellites in four minutes and twenty seconds no time for human
determination of an attack no time for human evaluation of different
responses barely time for the computer to determine that an attack
has been launched to decide on the appropriate response choose the
weapons and launch them barely enough time for the computer to
notify the human government of what it has chosen to do I is doing
and has done
1
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any modern military

79
19

ca
dependent on
c3 command control
onc31
communication and information modern technology has forced the
complete interaction of these four elements into smaller and smaller
windows of time using computer systems
is

COMPUTERS AND CONTROL

in world war 1I mobilization took months solzhenitsyn in his
novel august 1914 spends hundreds of pages describing the
mobilization in russia months to create the paperwork to move each
man to create the paperwork to buy supplies to create the paperwork
to stockpile supplies to create the paperwork to move supplies no
military machine could move faster than its paperwork
II in a marvelous scene
things moved somewhat faster in world war 11
in len deightons
Deigh tons recent novel goodbye mickey mouse the colonel
in charge of a small group of american bombers stationed in england
tries to discover whether his group will fly the next day he phones
an old friend at eighth air force headquarters late in the afternoon
for a chat sure enough in the background he hears the tele
teleprinters
printers
churning he hangs up and announces to his group that they will fly
he could visualize the scene at division

where they would be staring
teleprinted
tele printed figures it would take
at the cryptic gobbledygook of closely teleprinter
what was left of the afternoon to translate it all into specific orders
routes aiming points bombing altitudes timings radio procedures and
detailed instructions about the formations forming up procedures and
emergency measures I
1

that was the sequence for just one ordinary bombing run of one small
group under the eighth air force
no modern nuclear delivery system can depend on human
paperwork for execution of defense or offense only computers can
control the volume of information and the correct ordering of events
within the narrow window of time in which events must occur
COMPUTERS AND

information

A modern nuclear delivery system digests vast amounts of
information with the aid of a computer for example the US navy s
sound surveillance system SOSUS is a collection of underwater
acoustic sensors to locate ships by the sounds of their propellers
motors and random noises vast amounts of real time data are
reconaissance
naissance
reco
generated and coordinated with reports from spy satellites reconnaissance
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and ordinary covert intelligence 2 indexing storing
retrieving and assessing this volume of data by hand would take years
not hours
automatic computer interpretation of massive seemingly worthless
low level data can provide important high level information for
example the german military machine was very carefully run during
II all tanks planes tires and trucks were given serial
world war 11
numbers to provide for property control billing recalls and internal
quality control by studying the serial numbers of captured german
material and performing various mathematical analyses the allied
forces were able to make reasonable estimates about the level
of german war production they could deduce which factories were
responsible for what percentage of key items this information changed
currently the automatic analysis of
the priorities on bombing runs 3 3currently
literally thousands of different types of low level data is done
automatically for the military by the computer with minimal human
intervention
another example of computer interpretation of massive data
involves electronic eavesdropping on international telephone and
embassy microwave information the computer is programmed to save
any conversation that uses such key words as nuclear missiles war
or whatever may be of current interest conversations that do not
involve a key word are discarded the recorded conversations are then
evaluated by humans the sheer volume of mostly routine conversations
would swamp any human attempt to do this screening 4
computers also simulate and then analyze nuclear attacks and
counterattacks
counter attacks the analysis is crucial to assessing the consequences
and probabilities of particular attack plans in the event of a real
attack the united states has a computer model known as SIDAC
single integrated damage assessment capability at the pentagon
as well as at the protected underground alternate national military
command center SIDAC is programmed to take data from satellites
ground stations weather stations and other sources to estimate damage
and to plan our second round attack however a nuclear explosion
produces an electromagnetic pulse EMP which may cause widespread
damage and disruption to computers 6 such damage means that
computers may not be available for a second round attack since the
EMPs of a surprise attack may knock out computers and prevent a first
as well as a second round counterattack both sides must plan to launch
everything as soon as an attack is detected this necessity eliminates
the possibility of a limited nuclear war strategy 7
flights

5
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COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT

humans foul up seemingly inexplicable inconsistent and
unpredictable human goofs account for 30
50 70 percent of all failures
of major weapons and space vehicles 8 the loss of the submarine
thresher for example was due to a relief valves being installed
backwards it would obviously be very desirable if human errors could
be reduced or eliminated by the use of computers
but replacing people by computers does more than minimize
goof ups the US volunteer military one of the finest in
human goofups
the world has about 115000 people who are closely connected with
nuclear duties each year the defense personnel reliability program
removes from nuclear duties those persons whose reliability trustworthiness and dependability become inconsistent with standards
the number of people removed for various causes is surprisingly large
here for example are the figures for a three year period in the
mid 1970s9
PERSONS REMOVED FROM NUCLEAR DUTIES IN DEFENSE
PERSONNEL
PROGRAM

reliability

reason
alcohol abuse
drug abuse
negligence or delinquency
in performance of duty
court martiale
martials
marti als or civil convictions
of a serious nature
behavior or actions contemptuous
of the law
significant physical mental or
character trait or aberrant behavior
medically substantiated as prejudicial
to reliable performance

total

1975

1976

1977

169

184

1970
703

1474

737

286
1365
825

345

388

350

722

945

885

1219

1238

1289

5128

4966

5000

humans in a nuclear alert system operate under stress boredom and
isolation performing repetitive tasks for hours at a stretch and interacting
only with a terminal for weeks nothing happens as they wait in a
silo outside of bismarck north dakota staring at an unchanging
green screen waiting alongside missiles with the equivalent of millions
of tons of explosives although five thousand is a large number it
is amazing that under such circumstances only that many people a year
are found unsuitable for service
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in contrast to humans a computer does not suffer stress is not
subject to boredom and does not care about isolation it would seem
highly desirable then to replace people with computers that dont
take drugs wont go schizoid dont drink arent subject to blackmail
and will obey orders automatically
PROBLEMS WITH COMPUTERS

the

types of warning sensors that feed data to NORAD north
american aerospace defense command in colorado springs are as
sophisticated as they are varied they include infrared warning satellites
the ballistic missile early warning system a phased array radar system
perimeter acquisition radar attack characterization systems cobra
shamya island alaska and cobrajudy
cobra judy a
dane a radar system on shemya
floating version of cobra dane located in the arctic in addition
we have three defense support program satellites in fixed orbit
providing overlapping coverage of the USSR and china for ICBM launches
and the atlantic and pacific oceans for SLBMs the real time
information supplied by these satellites is sent to denver or to
alice springs australia for processing before being forwarded
simultaneously to NORAD SAC and the pentagon
when the sensors indicate sufficient strange data NORAD holds
one of three types of conferences missile display threat assessment
or missile attack no missile attack conference has ever been held
the exact number of the other two conferences has not been
declassified
declassified
de
reclassified
section of a 1980 congressional
de
classified
classified however a reclassified
report states that there were 147 missile display conferences and
five threat assessment conferences in the eighteen months from
1 january 1979 to 30 june 1980 10
descriptions of most such conferences are classified but a few
have appeared in various printed sources rather than discuss the
DEW line distant early warning false alerts in the 1950s caused
by a flock of canada geese or the BMEWS ballistic missile early
warning system false alerts in the 1960s from meteor showers and
lunar reflections 1I will concentrate on incidents from the 1970s and 1980
20 february 1971 A human operator at NORAD accidentally

transmitted the emergency message authorized by the
proper code for that date all radio and television stations
were ordered off the air by presidential order it took forty
minutes to find and send the proper cancel code 11
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february 1972 while president nixon was in china a
hoax message that the president had been assassinated and
III had been declared by vice president
that world war 111
lii
agnew was sent to twenty two units of the eighth coast
27

guard district

12

1973 A computer misinterpreted sensor data about a soviet

test missile fired from a site near iran the computer
predicted it would land in california and sparked a united
states alert the missile landed instead near kamchatka
siberia
3 october 1979 mount hebo radar station picked up a
low orbit rocket body that was close to decay and generated
a launch and impact report that forced NORAD to hold a

threat assessment conference
A NORAD technician inadvertently
on a tape that contained data simulating a mass

9 november 1979

put

soviet attack NORAD sent a warning of soviet submarine
missile attack to defense command centers across the
US ten fighters were scrambled and missile and
submarine bases were automatically switched to a higher level
of alert 13
march 1980 As part of a troop training exercise the
soviets launched four SS N 6 missiles from submarines
one of the launches generated an unusual threat fan and
forced NORAD to hold a threat assessment conference
15

3 june 1980 SAC received computer data indicating

SLBMs

had been launched toward the united states
NORAD was forced to hold a threat assessment conference
even though nothing was appearing on its screens it turned
out to be a hardware failure
and

ICBMs

6 bjune
6june 1980
june

three days after the 3 june hardware failure

again received computer data indicating that a soviet
missile attack had been launched and NORAD was forced
to hold another threat assessment conference 14
SAC

As we can see accidental alerts have been generated by human
carelessness jokes decaying satellites computer hardware errors
computer software errors and wrong computer tapes being loaded
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PROBLEMS WITH COMPLEX SYSTEMS

murphy s law if anything can go wrong it will functions in
our defense warning systems surely the reader living in the modern
world has experienced the computer generated error that cannot be
mislabeled
labeled utility bill which seems
changed the computer produced mis
impossible to correct A dozen telephone calls to as many individuals
only generates the infuriating response the computer is doing it
and no one seems to know how to make it stop computer controlled
multi state power grids have failed computer controlled trains have
derailed computer engineered bridges and dams have fallen down
computer controlled nuclear power plants have come close to
meltdowns
melt downs the best intentioned complex systems have failed
ford motor company did not intentionally put bad gas tanks in the
pinto but despite sophisticated testing systems computer simulations
an army of quality control procedures engineers and inspectors
despite having built other fine car systems despite the enormous
potential liability the design of the complex system was flawed the
three mile island nuclear power plant was not built until every aspect
of the design had been examined by dozens of regulatory agencies and
innumerable engineering studies had been conducted the defenders
of atomic power plants asserted that getting hit by a meteor was far
more likely than a major nuclear plant accident
and yet the
complex system failed 15
A complex computer system can go awry for many reasons one
is that the large amounts of money spent put tremendous pressure on
proponents of the system to deliver something that is working even
if this means patchwork that goes against the rules of the system
especially in complex military systems there is a tendency for
informal and usually oral understandings to circumvent the procedures
specified in the rulebooks
rule books for example with SAGE one of the early
radar warning systems if
rule
ruie book procedures were followed to the
ifrulebook
rulebook
letter small amounts of radar jamming paralyzed the system oral
agreements between operators solved this problem but the agreements
never showed up in official reports 16 the system that was designed
the system that was built and the system that was used were all
different congressional oversight committees and the generals in
charge often lacking technical computer skills only evaluate written
plans not the kludged up versions actually used
no complex system would ever run if rule books were followed
to the letter system analysts designers programmers coders and
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operators all circumvent official procedures at times in order to get
a system up and running within the time and money constraints such
rule cutting is oral informal and undocumented no wonder then
that a complex computer system which barely works under ordinary
circumstances does bizarre things in crisis mode
an incredible number of things can go wrong in a system things
obvious in retrospect but not at all obvious before the NORAD system
ca
c3 for nuclear defense rests is a chilling
upon which all of our c31
example the system was built in 1965 and is completely dependent
on computers which shut down automatically if there is a drop in the
power supply As of 1981 NORAD still had no reliable emergency
power supply 17 duty officers at NORAD have four recent historical
reminders to evaluate carefully what apparently may be erroneous data
despite the power and thoroughness of the system it is difficult for
it to detect surprise attacks in fact despite what in retrospect seem
to be clear warning signs the US global satellite warning system failed
to give advance notice of the soviet intervention in czechoslovakia
the tet offensive in vietnam
the 1973 yom kippur war 18 and
the argentine invasion of the falkland islands
COMPOUND STIMULI TO COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN CRISIS MODE

it is feasible to make plans for a computer system to handle single
unplanned incidents plans to prevent inadvertent releasing arming
or launching of a missile with a nuclear warhead plans which
systematically remove humans from the sequence of events launching
a nuclear tipped missile plans to prevent accidental detonations
deto nations by
wiring safety switches that arm the warhead plans for a computer
scheduled launch when humans may be panicking or thinking of the
wife and kids for one last time but it is not feasible to design a
computer system that will correctly handle multiple unplanned
incidents the number of different ways N incidents can interact is
governed by the combinatorial explosion and rapidly goes beyond any
possible computer technology even for such small values of N as
60 or 70 there has been at least one such multiple incident event
involving our early warning system 19 the british and french invasion
of the suez occurred at the same time as the hungarian uprising in
1936 on 5 november moscow issued a statement strongly
november 1956
hinting possible rocket attacks on london and paris and inviting the
US to join the USSR in a joint action in the suez that night the
US military command in europe reported that unidentified aircraft
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as
over turkey had put the turkish air force on alert A hundred mig 115s
were reported over syria a british canberra bomber was reported as
downed over syria and the russian fleet was reported moving through
Darda nelles 20
the dardanelles
NORAD had existed back in 1956 it is highly probable that these
if
ifnorad

multiple reports combined with the high state of international
tensions due to the hungarian uprising would have increased the alert
status of US forces let us see why a warning system does not necessarily
mean better security in such a situation
A warning system may accidentally become part of the offensive
system by issuing an alert erroneously two mutually linked warning
systems may unintentionally amplify such mistakes the outbreak of
world war 1I provides a concrete example of what can happen with
mutually linked systems the decision to mobilize in the early months
of 1914 set thousands of orders into operation each of them ratcheting
the military system to a higher level until it reached a state where the
system reacted to itself when country A went on alert at a time of
tensions country B reacted to the changed state and went on alert to
protect itself when country A observed that country B had gone on
alert country A had added reason to believe its earlier interpretations
of the data which had forced it to go on alert country A therefore
took additional preparatory steps As each country went to a higher
level of alert both countries had to take actions to make sure they
could perform after an attack both countries therefore prepared to
be attacked interpreting the others preparation to be attacked as a
step in preparing to launch an attack 21 in effect the european political
leaders decision to mobilize in early 1914 was a declaration of war
months before the hostilities actually broke out the most appalling
feature of world war 1I was not the destruction
but rather it was
the wars pointlessness ten million men died and monarchies were
swept from power simply because governmental leaders did not think
through the implications of their actions and the institutions they had
constructed for the prevention of war
war2222
1936 was as follows the
the reality of the events of 5 november 1956
jets over turkey were a flock of swans the hundred migs over syria
were an escort for the syrian president returning from a state visit to
moscow Brit
britaina
britains
ains canberra bomber landed in syria because of
mechanical failure the soviet fleet was going through the dardanelles
Darda nelles
on fleet exercises that had been scheduled long in advance
the warning system in a crisis situation had accidentally amplified
multiple independent unpredictable events into a nonexistent pattern
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NUCLEAR ALERTS AND

8877

accidental NUCLEAR WAR

modern military systems are complex geographically dispersed
and technologically sophisticated the development of nuclear weapons
has advanced faster than the development of reliable control of nuclear
weapons in an attempt to provide control both the US and the USSR
have used computers thus the reliability of the mutually linked nuclear
systems depends on the reliability of the underlying complex computer
systems but humans designed programmed coded and now operate
these systems that systematically replace humans as much as possible
and bypass a constitution designed for an isolated and sparsely settled
nation although the constitution asserts that only congress can declare
war and that the president is commander in chief these provisions have
been made irrelevant the decision to go to war must be made in less
than fifteen minutes by an unelected presidentially authorized duty
officer dependent on computer generated data
the president of the united states and the premier of the soviet
union may be compared to the president of a nuclear power plant 23
As long as things are running normally at the power plant the president
has both real and symbolic powers but if it is announced that a core
meltdown could occur in fifteen minutes the president who doesnt
know heavy water from drinking water will do exactly what he or
she is told to do if he or she is consulted at all technicians and
institutional procedures take over split second decisions are made based
on massive amounts of ambiguous technical information some humans
will question whether this isnt a test or a mistake and some
computer systems will not quite cover what is happening these parts
of the system will hang suspended awaiting orders from someone who
has or will take responsibility the figurehead president cannot take
action and issue technical orders because of the sheer volume and
ambiguity of the information and the incredibly narrow time window
similarly at the moment of a nuclear alert the massive amounts of
highly technical and ambiguous information from warning and
intelligence systems would be gibberish to a technically naive president
or premier awakened in the middle of the night and given five minutes
to respond the political leader can only hope that the duty officer
making the final evaluation is competent
if the duty officer sees either an expected pattern or a pattern that
is manifestly absurd the system will probably work as it is supposed
to on the other hand if the pattern is ambiguous strange
unexpected or contradictory if it occurs during a brownout or shortly
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after a new system has come on line or shortly after one of the satellites
has been moved or just before during or just after a training
exercise then the complex system will be in an untested configuration
with unpredictable results only one thing is certain murphy s law
will hold
if the soviets attack in a stylized and highly predictable way
NORAD will probably react correctly but if the attack is ambiguous
or if it occurs in conjunction with a flock of geese a lunar reflection
a NORAD simulated tape accidentally inserted a defective computer
chip or any other pattern that does not fit the NORAD notion of a
soviet attack it may not be discerned in time
both the US and the USSR are hostages to the fear that their
forces will be eliminated by a preemptive attack occurring so quickly
that they cannot respond game playing strategy suggests that both
sides will move to a launch on warning mode in which each side
warns the other that upon detection of attack the order will be given
to launch automatically both sides will then be at the mercy of every
forty six cent chip bought at lowest bid and of every software error that
accidentally generates a warning of an impending attack
THE

3

JUNE 1980 NUCLEAR ALERT

the event that occurred on 3 june

1980 was in fact generated by
a forty six cent computer chip malfunction at approximately 226 AM
eastern daylight time the fluorescent display screens connected to
a nova data general computer at SAC headquarters flashed a
warning indicating that two SLBMs had been launched toward the
united states on a depressed trajectory from submarines positioned
offshore eighteen seconds later the SAC display system showed an
SLBM launches the SAC duty controller scrambled
increased number of
ofslbm
116 B 52 crews and directed them to start their engines and to prepare
for takeoff if it became necessary to survive nuclear submarine
commanders were also alerted the SAC display then indicated that soviet

had been launched toward the united states the separate
NMCC command post confirmed that it too was receiving indications
that SLBMs had indeed been launched toward the US NORAD still
reported nothing on its screens the airborne command post of the
pacific command took off NORAD was forced to hold a threat
ICBMs

assessment conference even though nothing was appearing on its screens 24
had the episode lasted a few minutes longer the president would
have been awakened at 230 AM he would have been informed that
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he had only a few minutes in which to get to his plane decide and
issue a retaliatory plan and get on the hot line to moscow
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

perhaps peace is not so much a technological problem as it is a
political and moral problem
the united states and the soviet union have previously made
arrangements concerning accidental nuclear war before president
dixons
nixons 1971 visit to china the USSR feared that china might try
to provoke a US USSR confrontation by arranging for a submarine
off the US coast to launch a missile which would be blamed on the
soviets therefore on 50
30 september 1971 the two governments signed
an agreement designed to prevent the accidental outbreak of nuclear
war article

3

states

undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of
detection by missile warning systems of unidentified objects or in the
event of signs of interference with these systems or with related
communications facilities if such occurrences could create a risk of
outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries 25

the parties

this

1971 agreement was made when there were perhaps thirty minutes

between detection and retaliation if it appeared that either sides
computers had detected a launch there was time time to evaluate
the data time to notify the opposing side time for the opposing side
7 1 reaction time has decreased
1971
to show the error in the data since 19
from thirty minutes to fifteen with space war technology it will go
from fifteen minutes to five
instead of asking whether nuclear war can be avoided we should
first tackle the more manageable but equally important question
can nuclear alerts be avoided going on alert when the window of
time is a mere fifteen minutes may be so provocative that the other
side will be forced to go on alert to protect itself at this point the
ca
side with the weaker c31
c3 computer system may be forced into a use
it or lose it preemptive launch what a tragedy especially if the alert
is generated by a computer chip malfunction or a software error
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douglas campbell

11
II

is a professor

of computer science at brigham young university

Ball
bail
bali annne books 1982 115
len deighton goodbye mickey mouse new york ballantine
paul
aul bracken the Comman
and control ofnuclear
command
dand
of nuclear forces new haven yale university press 1983 14
3richard
arichard
richard ruggles and henry brodie an empirical approach to economic intelligence in world war
jae american statistical association 42 march 1947 72 911
tae
the
journal of
odthe
ofthe

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1985

13

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 6

BYU studies

90

how we spy on the russians washington post magazine 9 december 1979
25 harry rositzke the KGB the eyes of russia garden city NY doubleday 1981
197 98
pun
war gaming and military simulation models studies
united states joint chiefs of staff catalog of pan
wr
analysis and gaming agency 1977 217 18
II and 111
nuclear pulse 1I 11
III
lii science 29 may 1981 1009 12 5 june 1981 1116 19 12 june 1981
nicolas danieloff
Dani eloff

1248 51
71bid
bid

12

june

1981

1249

Space Aeronautics 49 march 1968
minimizing human errors
spacelaeronautics
72
spaceaeronautics
ghouse
house committee on appropriations subcommittee on military construction hearings on military
ad sess
construction appropriations for 1979 95th cong 2d
Io iosenate
senate committee on armed services recent false alerts from the nations missile attack warning
system
ad sess 1 3
96th cong 2d
war alert a comedy of
US errors london times 22 february 1971 why america ignored
ofus
this message of doom london times 28 february 1971
on the alert on a hoax newsway
News day 8 march 1972
newsday
12on
error alerts US forces to a false missile attack
new york times
13a
A 0 sulzberger jr
11 november 1979 30
US aides recount moments of false missile alert new york times
16 december 1979 25
richard burt
bun false nuclear alarms spur urgent effort to find flaws new york times
alg missile alerts traced to 46 cent item new york times 18 june 1980 alg
13 june 1980 aig
aig
pentagon identifies cause of fake
false
faise
fahe missile alert soviet aerospace 2 3 june 1980 558

charles E

cornell

bracken command and control of nuclear forces 49 5511
IN
N F kristy man in a large information processing system his changing role in

ca rand corp 1963 8 10 31
17
pears
NORAD blackout chill panel
fears of
baltimore sun
ofnorad
any
bracken command
and control of
nuclear forces 34
commandandcontrol
ofnuclear
ibid
191bid

21 may 1981

SAGE

santa monica

8

65 66

herman finer dudles
duties
dulles over suez new york quadrangle books 1964 418 21
2 bracken
command and control of nuclear forces 553
221bid
221bid
ibid 2
231ibid
231bid
bid 58
13 june 1980 alg
aig
burt false nuclear alarms spur urgent effort to find flaws new york times 13june
16
aaig
lg
pentagon identifies cause
missile alerts traced to 46 cent item new york times 18 june 1980 A
of false missile alert soviet aerospace 23 june 1980 58
25 geraid
gerald C smith Double
tae
the first strategic arms limitation talks garden city
talk the story of
doubletalk
odthe
NY doubleday 1980 518
1

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol25/iss1/6

14

